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We analyze the effect of external financing concerns on managers’ financial reporting behavior 
prior to management buyouts (MBOs). Prior studies hypothesize that managers intending to 
undertake an MBO have an incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce the purchase price. 
We hypothesize that managers also face a conflicting reporting incentive associated with their 
efforts to obtain external financing for the MBO and to lower their financing cost. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, we find that managers who rely the most on external funds to finance their 
MBOs tend to report less negative abnormal accruals prior to the MBOs. In addition, the relation 
between external financing and abnormal accruals is tempered when there are more fixed assets 
that can serve as collateral for debt financing.  
Keywords: MBO, earnings management, debt financing, managerial incentives 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Prior studies suggest that firms manage earnings prior to corporate events such as: MBOs (Perry 
and Williams 1994), seasoned public offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Shivakumar 2000), stock-
for-stock mergers (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004), reverse leverage buyouts (Chou, Gombola, and 
Liu 2006), open-market repurchases (Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008), and Dutch-auction tender offers (Louis 
and White 2007). These studies generally focus on managers’ incentives to use reporting discretion to 
influence equity market investors. There is little consideration in the literature, however, to the presence 
of reporting incentives that conflict with the incentives to influence equity market investors.   
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We analyze the effect of external financing considerations on managers’ financial reporting 
behavior prior to management buyouts (MBOs). Our interest in MBOs is heightened by the resurgence in 
MBO activities starting with the late 1990s and managers’ renewed interest in MBOs due partly to the 
desire to avoid the compliance costs associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 
2007). We are also interested in the MBO setting because extant studies on earnings management prior to 
MBOs yield mixed results. DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of earnings management prior to MBOs 
whereas Perry and Williams (1994) report evidence consistent with downward earnings management. By 
controlling for external financing incentives, we may be able to provide clearer evidence that managers 
respond to equity market incentives. Nonetheless, our main motivation for choosing the MBO setting is 
the potential conflicting financial reporting incentive associated with external financing considerations.  
Managers planning to undertake an MBO want to purchase their firms’ equity at as low a price as 
possible. Consequently, previous studies hypothesize that managers have an incentive to release less 
favorable earnings reports to equity market participants prior to an MBO in an attempt to reduce the MBO 
purchase price (e.g., Perry and Williams 1994). We consider the possibility that managers have a 
conflicting earnings management incentive prior to MBOs that is attributable to external financing 
concerns, which are thought to be substantial (see, e.g., Osborn 1984; Kosman 1998; Tran 2000). In the 
framework we employ for our analysis, the financing related reporting incentive is driven by 
management’s concerns regarding their ability to obtain MBO financing from external parties and their 
desire to obtain that financing at a favorable cost. The financing incentive conflicts with the equity market 
incentive because the financing incentive suggests that managers should manage earnings upward.  
Consequently, to the extent that an external financing incentive exists, we expect it to temper the equity 
market incentive. Based upon our framework, we hypothesize that financing related earnings management 
incentives are more pronounced when the funds needed to execute the buyout must be raised to a greater 
extent from external parties.  In addition, we hypothesize that the increase in financing related incentives 
arising from increased external financing is greater when there are fewer fixed assets available to secure 
loans. We find evidence consistent with both hypotheses.   
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 The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on 
financing of MBOs. Section 3 discusses managers’ conflicting reporting incentives prior to MBOs and 
formulates our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our earnings management proxy. Section 5 describes the 
sample selection process and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6 reports univariate results on 
earnings management prior to MBOs and the correlation between earnings management and the source of 
the MBO financing. Section 7 reports multivariate regression results on the association between earnings 
management and external financing. The study concludes in Section 8. 
2. Financing of management buyouts 
  Management buyouts are a form of leveraged buyout in which the management team is part of the 
investment group buying the firm. Other members of the investment group may be a buyout specialist or 
an investment bank. The investment group may finance the transaction through internal sources.  In most 
cases, however, MBO firms obtain additional financing from external sources by leveraging the 
company’s assets through secured bank loans that may be syndicated. In addition, further external debt 
financing may be attained through private placements of subordinated claims with institutions such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, or venture capital firms or through public offerings of “high yield” 
or “junk” bonds. After raising the cash required to implement the buyout, the investment group purchases 
the firm via a merger or a tender offer. See Weston, Chung, and Siu (1997, pp. 316-343) for more details.   
  While MBOs are generally financed through debt from external sources, internal financing can be 
substantial. According to statistics from Portfolio Management Data, the percentage of equity invested by 
buyout firms was 31.6% in 1998 and 37% in 1999 (Tran 2000). In fact, some MBOs are financed entirely 
through internal funds. For instance, Ecometry Corporation states in its Schedule 14A filing with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): “The total amount of cash required to consummate the SG 
Merger is estimated to be approximately $23 million, all of which will be paid by the surviving 
corporation from the cash that we currently have on hand.” As another example, PartsBase states in its 
filing: “The Acquisition Group, through the cash reserves of PRTS which will become available 
immediately upon the effectiveness of the merger, has sufficient funds available to pay the merger 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
consideration and pay its portion of the fees and expenses incurred in connection with the merger. The 
merger is not conditioned on any financing arrangements.” In summary, there appears to be some 
significant variation in the funding sources for MBOs, which is critical for our analysis.  
3. Conflicting reporting incentives prior to management buyouts 
  Extant literature on earnings management suggests that managers have incentives to manage 
earnings downward prior to a buyout in order to reduce the purchase price (see, for example, DeAngelo 
1986; and Perry and Williams 1994). We argue that external financing concerns could mitigate, but not 
necessarily dominate, these incentives to manage earnings downward. As has been discussed in prior 
studies, the economic rents arising from MBOs can be quite substantial.1 While MBOs can provide ample 
benefits to the buyout group, securing the debt financing to execute them is often difficult (see Osborn 
1984; Nelson 1985; Buccino 1989; Kosman 1998; and Tran 2000). Thus, at the margin, managers could 
be dissuaded from managing earnings down to secure a lower equity purchase price, which increases 
economic rents, because it could jeopardize their ability to obtain the financing needed to capture those 
rents and adversely alter the terms at which the financing is obtained. Hence, on average, managers who 
rely the most on external sources of financing are likely to deflate earnings prior to MBOs to a lesser 
extent than those who rely the most on internal sources of financing. 
3.1 Illustrative model  
  To further develop our intuition, we analyze a stylized equilibrium model of financial reporting 
prior to an MBO where we assume the manager’s objective is to manage earnings to minimize total costs, 
which have three components: the MBO purchase price, the incremental cost of external financing for the 
MBO, and the reporting cost. Consider a setting where a manager, who anticipates an MBO, prepares an 
                                                     
1These benefits include: tax benefits (Kaplan 1989); mitigation of agency costs (Jensen, 1986), stronger managerial 
incentives under private ownership (DeAngelo et al. 1984); savings of registration, listing, and shareholder servicing 
costs (DeAngelo et al. 1984); expropriation of bondholders (Masulis 1980); and avoidance of compliance costs 
associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007). 
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earnings report, r, for his firm. The manager can engage in earnings management that is not observed by 
external parties so the report satisfies r = e + m, where e is unmanaged earnings and m is the level of 
earnings management (i.e., m > 0 is upward earnings management and m < 0 is downward earnings 
management). If the manager engages in earnings management, he expects to incur some legal or 
regulatory costs equal to 
λr
2
m2, where λr > 0. Consistent with prior earnings management studies, we use a 
quadratic cost function because it permits a simple closed-form equilibrium characterization of the 
manager’s earnings management strategy (See Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; or Dye and Sridhar 2004).  
 To execute the MBO, the manager must have funds to purchase the equity he does not already 
own and pay for existing senior claims that must be settled. Let P be the funds required to execute the 
MBO.  We assume P = α + λe(r – m̂e), where α > 0 represents the payment required to settle senior claims 
plus any intercept term in a linear pricing function for outstanding equity, λe represents the sensitivity of 
the equity market price to equity market participant beliefs about unmanaged earnings, λe > 0, and m̂e is 
the equity market participants’ beliefs about the manager’s earnings management choice.  Hence, the 
linear function captures the idea that the equity price is an increasing linear function of the market beliefs 
about unmanaged earnings, which are increasing in the report and decreasing in the market beliefs about 
the manager’s earnings management.   
 The manager expects to raise f ≥ 0 funds from external sources, with the remaining funds coming 
from the MBO group, which includes the manager.  The incremental cost of the externally raised funds is 
a decreasing function of the manager’s earnings report, where the sensitivity of the cost to the earnings 
report is decreasing in the level of the target firm’s fixed assets, a, that can be employed as collateral. 
Formally, the incremental cost per unit of the external financing, R, is [αf – λf(a)(r – m̂f)], where αf > 0, 
λf(a) > 0, λf'(a) < 0, and m̂f is the external financing market beliefs about the extent of earnings 
management. This function implies that the manager can obtain financing at more favorable rates if the 
external financiers believe economic earnings are higher.  We assume that the external financing cost is 
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less sensitive to beliefs about economic earnings when there are more fixed assets to serve as collateral 
because the additional collateral makes the financiers’ debt claims less reliant on future earnings flows for 
payment. Given the structure of the model, the manager’s reporting objective is to choose m to minimize 
the cost function 
 P + Rf + 
λr
2
m2 = [α + λe(r – m̂e)] + [αf – λf(a)(r – m̂f)]f + 
λr
2
m2. (1) 
As an aside, we should note that our model specification does not explicitly include a notion of credit 
rationing, which is often referred to as a barrier for executing an MBO. We could implicitly build this 
notion into the manager’s objective function by assuming that the incremental cost of external financing 
can be so large as to make the MBO infeasible. 
 A crucial assumption required for the development of our hypothesis is that the manager believes 
that neither the equity market participants nor the external financiers observe his actual earnings 
management choice. Consequently, the manager treats the equity market participant and financer’s beliefs 
regarding his earnings management, m̂e and m̂f respectively, as being unaffected by his actual choice.  It 
follows that, even if the manager’s earnings management activities are perfectly anticipated, the manager 
still engages in earnings management because he would be worse off not managing earnings.2     
 The quadratic nature of the cost function implies that the optimal choice of m is finite and 
satisfies the necessary first order condition, which can be expressed as:  
 λe – λf(a)f + λrm = 0.  (2) 
The first term, λe, captures the benefit of a marginal increase in downward earnings management arising 
from its influence on the beliefs of equity market participants, while the second term, λf(a)f, captures the 
cost of a marginal increase in downward earnings management attributable to its influence on financier 
beliefs. This second term is critical to our intuition because, assuming external financing is necessary to 
                                                     
2This reasoning has been used in many analytical models (Narayanan 1985; Stein 1989; and Fischer and Verrecchia 
2000) as well as in motivations of empirical work (Erickson and Wang 1999; and Shivakumar 2000). 
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complete the MBO, it conflicts with the incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce equity price. 
Finally, the third term captures the change in the expected legal and regulatory costs of decreasing m, 
which are positive if m < 0 and negative if m > 0. 
 If we impose the standard requirement that the equity and external financing market have rational 
expectations in equilibrium, we can completely characterize an equilibrium level of earnings 
management, m*.  In a rational expectations equilibrium, m̂f = m̂e = m
*, and m* is optimal for the manager 
given that m̂f = m̂e = m
* (i.e., equation (2) must be satisfied).  Hence, it follows that m* must satisfy 
equation (2) after substituting in m* for all m̂f, m̂e and m.  Substituting in m
* into equation (2) and 
rearranging yields the rational expectations equilibrium m*: 
  m* = 
–λe + λf(a)f
λr
. (3) 
In summary, then, equity market and external financing market participants anticipate that the manager 
will manage earnings down by 
λe – λf(a)f
λr
.  Hence, in the absence of external financing needs, f = 0, 
downward earnings management equals to 
λe
λr
, which is consistent with the hypothesis in prior literature. 
3.2 Hypotheses   
 A simple comparative static exercise using equation (4) yields our primary hypothesis: 
 
dm*
df
 = 
λf(a)
λr
 > 0. (4) 
That is, when the MBO buyout group anticipates raising more external funds, managers engage in less 
downward earnings management, as reflected in a higher m. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H1.  The level of earnings management in the earnings report issued prior to the MBO offer date is 
positively associated with the amount of external financing obtained to finance the MBO. 
 The model yields another testable hypothesis related to external financing concerns.  Consider 
how changes in the amount of fixed assets that can serve as collateral, a, affect the sensitivity of the level 
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of downward earnings management to changes in the level of external financing.  Differentiating 
dm*
df
 with 
respect to the level of fixed assets yields: 
 
d2m*
dfda
 = 
λf'(a)
λr
 < 0. (5) 
It follows that, when the firm has more fixed assets to serve as collateral and the MBO group intends to 
raise more external funds, managers perceive there is less “return” to managing earnings up to appease 
the external financing market.  As a consequence, the sensitivity of earnings management to an increase 
in external financing is reduced. This finding forms the basis for our second testable hypotheses. 
H2. The positive association between the level of earnings management prior to the MBO and the 
amount of external debt financing is lower when the MBO firm has more physical assets. 
We note that both the primary and secondary hypotheses hold even if we assume deviations from perfect 
rational expectations, such as in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000).  
 One assumption in the model is that the anticipated level of external financing is fixed and that 
internal sources of financing vary with differences in the acquisition price induced by differences in the 
level of earnings management.  If the reverse is true so that the level of internal financing is fixed at f and 
the level of external financing varies, one might assert that the external financing concerns would magnify 
the incentives for downward earnings management and eliminate the conflicting reporting incentive.  
While the first part of the assertion is true, the second part does not follow from the first. Assuming that 
the level of internal financing is fixed, we can show that (1) the level of earnings management is 
negatively associated with the level of internal financing, which is intuitively equivalent to H1, and (2) 
the negative relation between internal financing and level of earnings management is tempered when the 
MBO firm has more physical assets, which naturally corresponds to H2. Therefore, external financing 
concerns still provide a conflicting reporting incentive even if the amount of external financing changes 
dollar for dollar with the equity price.  What is required for the tension to exist is that (1) some level of 
external financing is employed over the range of possible equity prices (P must be weakly greater than f) 
and (2) the incremental cost per unit of external financing must be decreasing in the earnings report. 
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3.3 Validity of critical assumptions 
  While the illustrative model generates testable hypotheses, we have not offered much a priori 
evidence about the validity of the critical underlying assumptions. Below, we discuss more thoroughly the 
three critical assumptions in the illustrative model: 1) the manager believes that neither equity market 
participants nor external financing market participants observe whether accruals arise from natural 
business activities or earnings management activities, 2) accruals that can be managed affect the earnings 
measure employed by participants in both markets, and 3) external financiers are less responsive to 
reported performance when more assets are available to secure debt.  
  In the context of MBOs, the extent to which the first assumption is satisfied for prospective 
external financiers depends on whether these financiers are privy to a firm’s accruals decisions. One 
might argue that managers will simply manage earnings down to affect the equity market and then 
privately inform prospective external financiers about that earnings management. Prospective financiers, 
however, would likely view such disclosures as uninformative cheap talk and, more importantly, such 
disclosures would magnify shareholder litigation risks. In addition to the a priori reasoning just provided, 
some anecdotal evidence suggests that external financiers are not always privy to earnings management 
decisions and, as a consequence, have provided debt financing just prior to failures.3  For example, Crazy 
Eddie Inc. and Crime Control Inc. were found to have manipulated their financial statements prior to 
raising significant amounts of private debt just before their collapses. 
  With respect to the second assumption, there exists some evidence suggesting that MBO debt 
financiers are likely to rely on statistics affected by accruals to predict future cash flows and make credit 
                                                     
3Admittedly, these anecdotes violate our simple illustrative model because, even if the earnings management is not 
observable, the assumption in our model is that the external financing market perfectly anticipates it.  This violation, 
however, is entirely attributable to the additional assumption in the model that the external financing market knows 
the manager’s reporting objective function.  If this assumption is dropped, as it is in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), 
then the external financing market will anticipate earnings management only on average. 
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decisions. First, financial statement analysis texts identify statistics utilized in credit analysis that are a 
function of accruals (e.g., earnings, working capital, total assets) (see, e.g., Palepu, Healy, and Bernard 
2000 or White, Sondhi, and Fried 1999). Second, practitioner oriented literature provides numerous 
examples of creditors employing statistics that are a function of accrual decisions.  For example, Tran 
(2000) asserts: “banks often won’t lend beyond a conservative multiple of earnings” (emphasis added) 
(see also Osborn 1984; Kosman 1998). In addition, Eastman (1997) states that earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is “the most popular measure of cash flow among 
commercial lenders and credit analysts.”4 Although EBITDA is immune to earnings management through 
interest, amortization, and tax accruals, it is still subject to earnings management through sales, cost of 
sales, and other income and expense related accruals.  Third, in the academic literature, Dichev and 
Skinner (2002) document that the three most common ratios used in debt covenants are debt to cash flow, 
earnings to interest coverage, and earnings to fixed charge coverage. They note that cash flow is often 
defined in the covenants as either earnings before interest, and taxes (EBIT) or EBITDA, which implies 
that these ratios are all influenced by some accrual decisions. Because these ratios are used extensively in 
the debt contracts themselves, one might expect that lenders also use them in their loan authorization and 
pricing decisions. Finally, a reading of the MBOs’ proxy statements reveals that the ratio of debt to 
EBITDA also determines the rate that lenders charge on the loans and that some lenders require a certain 
amount of cash, account receivables, and inventory as a condition to finance a transaction.5 In sum, the 
evidence garnered from multiple sources suggests that it is plausible that the second condition is satisfied 
and that accruals can be used to influence the decisions of external financiers.  
 The third assumption that external financiers lending decisions are influenced less by measures of 
financial performance when the MBO firm has a greater established physical asset base also finds some 
                                                     
4See also Sutherland (1988), Barker (1992), Prager and Block (1992), Hempstead (1999), Ramani (2001), or Sorkin 
(2007) for discussions of examples where EITDA is employed in the context of MBO financing and valuation. 
5See, e.g., the proxy statements for the MBOs of Atrix International, Spring Industries, and Westerbeke. 
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support in the literature. Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) suggest that collateral and screening are 
substitutes so that a firm with more collateral is likely to incur less intensive screening before credit is 
granted. Furthermore, Inderst and Müller (2006) suggest that collateral improves a bank’s payoffs from 
financing a project, thus raising the likelihood that credit will be granted at favorable terms. Accordingly, 
prior empirical studies suggest that credit availability increases in the value of a firm’s assets (Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994).  
3.4 Suggestive evidence 
  The mixed results reported in extant studies on earnings management prior to MBOs leave open 
the possibility that external financing concerns may be important determinants of earnings management 
decisions. More specifically, DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of earnings management prior to MBOs 
while Perry and Williams (1994) find evidence consistent with downward earnings management using a 
different sample and methodology. Perry and Williams (1994), however, do not find evidence of earnings 
management for firms in the DeAngelo’s sample. As Perry and Williams (1994) argue, the divergence 
between their results and DeAngelo’s results appears to be attributable to the use of different sets of firms 
as opposed to different methodologies.  One dimension along which the two sets of firms differ may be 
the extent of financing related incentives, in addition to other changes in the economic environment.  
  In addition to the direct tests of earnings management by DeAngelo (1986) and Perry and 
Williams (1994), empirical evidence in Kaplan (1989) is consistent with managers’ reports being 
influenced by external financing concerns. Specifically, Kaplan (1989) finds that firms’ profitability 
following buyouts is 6 percent lower than management’s forecast at the time of the buyout. This result 
suggests that, on average, some managers portray over-optimistic prospects for their firms prior to MBOs.  
4. Estimated abnormal current accruals as a proxy for earnings management 
  Following the earnings management literature, we proxy for earnings management by measuring 
a firm’s abnormal accruals. We conduct the analysis on the basis of abnormal current accruals because of 
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the observation that EBITDA is commonly employed in credit decisions.6 In addition, as Healy (1985) 
argues, long-term accruals, like depreciation, account for little variation in total accruals. 
  Using all firms that have the necessary data on Compustat, for each two-digit SIC code industry, 
we estimate the following model for each year: 
        CAi = α0 + α1∆SALESi + α2LCAi + εit,            (6) 
where CA is current accrual of firm i; ∆SALES is change in sales; LCA is the lag of CA; and ε is the 
regression residual. Current accrual is defined as change in non-cash current assets (Compustat data item 
4 minus Compustat data item 1) minus change in current liabilities (Compustat data item 5) plus change 
in the current portion of long-term debt (Compustat data item 44). Missing values for the current portion 
of long-term debt are set to zero. Both sides of the regression, including the intercept, are scaled by 
beginning total assets. Each year, we delete the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles of the deflated current and 
lagged CA, and observations that have beginning total assets less than ten million dollars. The model (6) 
is an extension of the abnormal current accrual models used by Louis (2004), which are modifications of 
the Jones (1991) model. Following prior studies, we extend the extant abnormal current accrual model by 
controlling for lagged current accruals.7 The model in DeAngelo (1986), where abnormal accruals are the 
change in accruals from year to year, is the special case of model 1 with α0 = α1 = 0 and α2 = 1.
8 
                                                     
6We recognize, however, that managers could manipulate EBITDA in manner that affects noncurrent accruals.  For 
example, managers could expense capital expenditures, which would decrease current-period EBITDA, future-
period depreciation expenses, and potentially current-period depreciation expense.   
7Prior studies that model current accruals as a function of lagged accruals include Chambers (2001), Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2003), Louis and White (2007), and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008). 
8The average of the 22 cross-industry average adjusted R2 for the fiscal years from 1984 to 2005 is 0.23. The cross-
industry average coefficient on change on sales (∆SALES) is positive in 21 (or 95.5%) of the 22 years. The cross-
industry average coefficient on lagged total accruals (LTA) is negative in 21 (or 95.5%) of the 22 years. The 
averages of the 22 cross-industry average coefficient estimates are very significant for both variables, with p-values 
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  We adjust our discretionary accrual measure for performance because Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney 
(1995) and Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) find that estimated discretionary accruals tend to be 
positively correlated with operating performance. Consistent with Louis (2004) and Gong, Louis, and Sun 
(2008), among others, each year and for each industry (two-digit SIC code), we create five portfolios by 
sorting the data into quintiles of return-on-assets (ROA). Discretionary current accruals are proxied by the 
abnormal current accruals (ABCA). ABCA for a given firm is the unexplained current accrual (UECA) 
(i.e., the residual) for that firm minus the median UECA of the matched portfolio. In addition to 
controlling for performance, the portfolio-benchmarking approach controls for random effects arising 
from other events that may affect accruals or other managerial incentives to manage earnings. As Kothari, 
Leone, and Wasley (2005) suggest, the benchmarking approach succeeds if the differences between the 
discretionary accruals of the MBO firms and those of the control portfolios effectively proxy for MBO 
related earnings management. 
5. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
5.1 Sample selection 
  The study covers completed MBOs with announcement dates between 1985 and 2005.9 The 
sample is obtained from the Security Data Company (SDC)’s online database of mergers and acquisitions. 
A transaction is included in the sample if: a) the target was a public company before the acquisition; b) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of 0.000. We find similar results across industries. The average of the 64 time-series average adjusted R2 is 0.24. 
The time-series average coefficient on ∆SALES is positive for 52 (or 81.3%) of the 64 two-digit SIC code industries. 
The time-series average coefficient on LTA is negative for 57 (or 89.1%) of the 64 industries. The averages of the 64 
time-series average coefficient estimates are significant for all three variables, with p-values of 0.000. We require at 
least eight observations for each estimation.  
9The sample includes one MBO (9278 Communications) that SDC mistakenly codes as pending. The bid was 
actually completed; we therefore reclassify it as such. The reclassification does not qualitatively change the results. 
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the acquirer is a private company; c) SDC indicates target’s management involvement in the acquisition; 
d) the share of the target that the bidder acquires or attempts to acquire in the transaction is reported by 
SDC (not including pre-buyout ownership); e) the acquiring firm owns (or attempts to own) 100 percent 
of the target after the transaction; f) the MBO firm has necessary Compustat data; and g) the amount of 
funds raised from external sources can be determined from SEC filings, description provided by SDC, 
and/or news reports on Factiva. There are 200 transactions that satisfy criteria a to f. Of these transactions, 
62 do not have enough available information to determine the amount of funds that were raised from 
external sources. The sample selection process then yields 138 transactions.  
  Information on the sources of funding for the MBOs comes primarily from proxy statements filed 
with the SEC. MBO firms file Schedule 14A with the SEC, where they report the amount and sources of 
funding for the transactions. This information is available through the historical Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) archives on the SEC website starting in 1994. In general, a 
Schedule 14A includes specific information on the total amount needed to purchase the outstanding 
shares, repay existing debt, pay the MBO fees and expenses, and provide working capital. The filing also 
provides the amounts of financing from various sources: contribution from management and/or the MBO 
group, cash balance, and debt financing (secured, subordinated, senior, and junior). External financing is 
typically the sum of the various forms of debt financing. We set external financing to zero when the filing 
states that the transaction is not subject to a financing contingency because the firm and/or the acquiring 
group have sufficient cash on hand. Some cases are relatively more complex, requiring some judgment. 
For example, Allied Capital uses an existing unsecured credit facility to finance the acquisition of 
SunSource. In this instance, the credit facility pre-dates the MBO and is granted based on the credit 
capacity of Allied Capital instead of the credit capacity of SunSource. Therefore, although the transaction 
is financed with debt, SunSources’ pre-MBO financial reporting has no bearing on the lender’s financing 
decision. In such a case, we set external financing to zero.  For transactions that do not have information 
in the historical EDGAR archives (mainly prior to 1994), we rely on information provided by SDC and 
news reports through Factiva to determine the amount of external funding. A comparison between the 
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information on EDGAR and the information provided by SDC for those transactions that took place after 
1993 shows that, in general, the information on SDC is reliable, though sometimes incomplete. If the 
information on SDC is not sufficient to determine the amount of external financing, we complete it with 
information provided in news reports that we obtain through Factiva.10 If we still cannot determine the 
amount of external financing for a transaction, we remove the observation from the sample.  
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
 The characteristics of the sample firms are presented in Table 1. Except for the external financing 
measures and the share of the company acquired in the MBO, we winsorize the top and bottom one-
percentiles (the top and bottom one or two observations) of all the variables.11 The mean (median) total 
financing from external sources is about 64.2 (63.4) percent of total firm value (market value of common 
equity plus the value of preferred stock (Compustat data item 130) plus total liabilities). The external 
financing is high relative to total firm value because MBO firms generally need funds to purchase the 
outstanding shares (usually with a substantial premium -- the average premium is 46.59%), pay off 
existing debt, pay the MBO fees and expenses, and have sufficient working capital for operations. The 
MBO firms also have large positive book-to-market ratios, ROA, (scaled) EBITDA, and (scaled) cash 
                                                     
10Because the SEC filings generally provide more information about the source of financing than SDC and press 
releases, the financing data that we collect from the filings might be more reliable than the data we obtain from SDC 
and/or in press releases. To assess the potential effects of using financing data from various sources, we conduct 
separate analyses for the period before and the period after 1994 (the first year when the proxy data are available in 
the historical EDGAR archives). The results are consistent across the two sub-periods.   
11We do not winsorize the external financing variables and the percentage of the shares outstanding acquired in the 
MBO because external financing is zero for many observations and the percentage of the shares outstanding 
acquired is 100 for many observations. For these variables, winsorization would affect only one tail of the 
distribution. Also, because the percentage acquired is limited at 100, this variable is unlikely to be affected by 
outliers or very large data errors.     
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flow from operations: with means (medians) of 0.877 (0.754), 0.144 (0.156), and 0.097 (0.100), 
respectively. Consistent with the conjecture that managers deflate accruals prior to MBOs, (scaled) 
current accruals are negative with a mean (median) of -0.010 (-0.007). The (scaled) change in capital 
expenditures is also negative with a mean (median) of -0.008 (-0.002). The reduction in capital 
expenditures is also consistent with the notion that managers have incentives to deflate reported earnings 
prior to MBOs. They can recognize some capital expenditures as expenses, which would reduce both 
capital expenditures and earnings. We recognize, however, that capital expenditures can also be lower if 
managers delay making investments to conserve cash to finance the MBOs.     
 Table 1 also compares the characteristics of firms with the lowest levels of external financing to 
those of firms with the highest levels of external financing. External financing is deemed low (high) if 
total external financing is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution within our 
sample firms. Comparing the bottom and top quartiles is likely to mitigate potential noise that might be 
associated with measurement errors in computing total external financing. External financing is deflated 
by total firm value.12 Because the MBO group generally has to both purchase the outstanding shares and 
pay off the existing debts, we want the deflator to reflect both the MBO firm’s equity and debt.  
  The proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction is significantly lower for the low 
external financing firms. The low external financing firms have significantly lower ROA, EBITDA, and 
current accruals. They also have significantly more negative changes in capital expenditures, which is 
consistent with the conjecture that the low external financing firms have stronger incentives to expense 
capital expenditures. Actually, both current accruals and change in capital expenditure are negative for the 
low external financing firms and positive for the high external financing firms. There is no evidence that 
depreciation expenses, special items, cash flow from operations, the market reaction to the MBO 
announcement, or the MBO premium are different across the two groups of firms.   
 
                                                     
12We cannot deflate by total financing because, in general, total financing is not available prior to 1994. 
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6. Earnings management prior to MBOs 
 Perry and Williams (1994) document that abnormal accruals are, on average, negative in the year 
prior to MBOs for a sample of transactions that took place in the 1970s and 1980s.  Since the 1980’s, 
however, pre-MBO financial reporting incentives may have changed in a significant manner.  For 
example, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act in 1998, which might have mitigated managers’ concerns 
about litigation associated with the pre-MBO financial reporting.  Because our sample comprises a more 
recent period in which reporting incentives may have differed, we first assess whether the pattern of 
abnormal accruals established for the earlier sample period persists in our sample period. 
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. Consistent with Perry and Williams (1994), we 
find significantly negative abnormal current accruals in the fiscal year ending immediately prior to the 
MBO announcements (Year 0). To ensure that our results capture the effects of the MBOs, we compare 
the abnormal current accruals for Year 0 with the abnormal current accruals for Year-2 (the fiscal year 
ending within 25 to 36 months prior to the MBO announcement). Consistent with the conjecture that the 
income-decreasing abnormal current accruals are related to the MBOs, we find no evidence of income-
decreasing abnormal current accruals in Year-2.13 To assess whether the results are sensitive to the 
potential effects of changes in the structure of MBO financing, we divide the sample period into two sub-
periods of 10 years each: 1985-1994 and 1996-2005. We do not have any sample observation in 1995. 
                                                     
13We use Year-2 instead Year-1 because some managers could start planning an MBO more than a year in advance; 
therefore, the observations for Year-1 could be contaminated. However, we obtain qualitatively similar results if we 
use Year-1 instead of Year-2. There are 126 sample firms that have necessary data in both Year 0 and Year-1. For 
these firms, the mean (median) unexpected current accruals in Year 0 are -0.024 (-0.009) and the mean (median) 
abnormal current accruals are -0.026 (-0.010), with p-values below 1%. In contrast, the mean (median) unexpected 
current accruals in Year-1 are -0.004 (0.007) and the mean (median) abnormal current accruals are -0.009 (0.000). 
They are all statistically insignificant. 
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The results for the subperiods are reported in Panel B of Table 2. We find evidence of accrual 
management for both sub-periods. Although there seems to be more downward earnings management in 
the later period, the difference is not statistically significant.  
  Table 3 provides some univariate analysis pertaining to our primary hypothesis that, on average, 
firms that rely more on debt financing deflate earnings less. In Panel A, we compare the abnormal current 
accruals of firms that rely the most on financing from external sources (top quartile of scaled external 
financing) with abnormal current accruals of firms that rely the least on financing from external sources 
(bottom quartile of scaled external financing). Consistent with H1, we find that firms that rely the most on 
financing from external sources report significantly less downward abnormal current accruals than firms 
that rely the least on financing from external sources.14 In Panel B, we compare the sample firms with the 
Compustat population. We make the comparison across firms with no debt issuance and those in the top 
decile of the distribution of debt issuance (scaled by total firm value at the beginning of the fiscal year) 
using all firms on Compustat that have necessary observations.15 For the MBO firms, we use the amount 
raised from external sources to finance the MBO (scaled by total firm value). Consistent with our 
expectations, we find that (1) firms in the top decile of external financing report higher abnormal current 
accruals across both the MBO firms and the Compustat population and (2) the MBO firms report more 
negative abnormal current accruals than the population across both external financing groups.  
    Table 4 reports the industry distribution of the abnormal accruals by the level of external 
financing. The MBOs are most concentrated in the manufacturing sector (59 out of 138 or 42.45 percent). 
                                                     
14We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use the median. The one-tail p-value for the difference in the median 
abnormal current accruals (unexplained current accruals) between firms that rely the most on financing from 
external sources and those that rely the least on financing from external sources is 0.004 (0.005).    
15
Note that the decile ranking is based on the entire Compustat population. The finer ranking (decile instead of 
quartile) is necessary to ensure that the control firms have the same level of debt as the sample firms. Most of our 
sample firms (101 of 138) are in the top decile of debt financing. 
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Abnormal current accruals are negative in all three major industrial sectors: manufacturing, 
merchandising, and services.16 Firms that rely the most on financing from external sources tend to report 
less downward abnormal accruals than firms that rely the least on financing from external sources across 
all the industrial groups.  
7. Regression analysis 
7.1 Conditional association between earnings management and external financing 
  We estimate the conditional association between abnormal current accruals prior to MBO 
announcements and external financing using the following regression model:                  
        ABCAi = α1SEFi + α2SPPEi + α3SEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect + εi.        (7A) 
where ABCA is the abnormal current accrual for the fiscal year that immediately precedes the MBO 
announcement; SEF is total financing from external sources scaled by total firm value; SPPE is beginning 
net property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) scaled by total firm value; CNTR is the proportion of the 
company controlled by the MBO group prior to the MBO, defined as 1 – ACQ, where ACQ is the 
proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; and BM is book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
  We expect a positive coefficient on SEF and a negative coefficient on the interaction between 
SEF and SPPE. We control for CNTR because managers’ incentives to deflate earnings prior to an MBO 
is likely to decrease as the share of the company they already control increases. Gong, Louis, and Sun 
(2008), for instance, find that managers’ incentives to deflate earnings prior to share repurchases increase 
with the share of the company that they actually repurchase. We control for BM because the stock prices 
of growth and value firms have different sensitivities to earnings and, therefore, managers of such firms 
                                                     
16The sample does not include any bank because current assets and current liabilities – the two main variables used 
to compute current accruals -- are not available on Compustat for banks. The sample includes five other financial 
service firms; we group them into “services”.  
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could have different incentives to manage earnings. We include year fixed effects to control for the 
potential effects of changes in the structure of MBO financing over the years.17  
  The results of the regression analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 5. Consistent with the 
results from the univariate analysis, we find a significantly positive association between external 
financing and pre-MBO abnormal current accruals. The coefficient on the interaction between external 
financing and PP&E is significantly negative, which is consistent with the conjecture that the effect of 
external financing on the marginal cost of managing earnings down prior to MBOs increases when a firm 
has few physical assets that it can use as collateral. 
  The scaled external financing measure is arguably more appropriate than the un-scaled measure 
to proxy for external financing because, everything else equal, a firm that has, for instance, a value of $20 
million and external financing of $18 million is more reliant on external financing than a firm that has a 
value of, say, $100 million and external financing of $30 million. Therefore, external financing should be 
scaled to account for the size of the firm.  
  On the other hand, as the total amount of external funds needed to finance the transaction 
increases, so does the difficulty to secure the financing, even after considering the firm value. As Kosman 
(1998) observes, there are specific difficulties associated with financing large buyouts, suggesting that un-
scaled external financing can be more relevant than the scaled measure in capturing the difficulty of 
obtaining financing. Therefore, we also express external financing (EF) and PPE in levels. More 
specifically, we use the following regression model: 
                                                     
17Prior studies suggest that political costs and leverage are related to managers’ incentives to manage earnings. 
Controlling for size (as a proxy for political costs) and leverage do alter our inferences. However, we do not include 
these variables in our model because they are not relevant in our setting. MBO firms are relatively small and are 
concerned mainly about their ability of raising the funds to finance the transaction. The effect of the financing 
concern is captured by EF in our model. 
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  ABCAi = α1LOGEFi + α2LOGPPEi + α3LOGEFi*LOGPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi  
                          + Year Fixed Effect + εi,                    (7B) 
where LOGEF is the logarithm of EF, [log (1 + EF)] and LOGPPE is the logarithm of PPE. We use the 
log transformation of these variables because their distributions are skewed. The log transformation is also 
likely to mitigate potential nonlinearity and heteroskedasticity problems.18 The results, reported in Panel 
B of Table 5, are consistent with the main results reported in Panel A.  
  To provide further evidence that the results are driven by the MBO transaction, as opposed to 
some other generic predictors of accruals, we also estimate the model for the second year prior to the pre-
MBO year. We measure ABCA over the fiscal year ending within 25 to 36 months prior to the MBO 
announcement (Year-2). We also measure PPE and BM at the beginning of Year-2. The other variables, 
LOGEF and CNTR are measured as in Model 7A. Because the predictions are conditioned on the 
occurrence of the buyouts, we expect them to hold for the pre-MBO year (Year 0), but not for Year-2. 
The results are reported in Table 6. There are 108 MBOs that have the necessary data in both Year 0 and 
Year-2. Hence, in Table 6, we report the results for the 108 firms in Year 0, which replicates Table 5, and 
for those same firms in Year-2. The results are generally consistent with those reported in Table 5 for 
Year 0. However, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero in Year-2, suggesting that 
the documented effects are attributable to the buyouts.  
7.2 Controlling for the effect of endogeneity 
  As was suggested in the discussion of the illustrative model, the level external financing may be 
endogenous because the amount of external financing could be a function of the pre-MBO earnings 
                                                     
18To mitigate the potential effects of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom one-percentiles of ABCA, LOGPPE, 
and PPE/ASSET. Because the sample has only 138 observations, the winsorization affects only a few observations. 
To further ensure that the results are not driven by a few observations, we use Cook’s (1977) D Influence statistics 
to test for influential observations. None of the D statistics is over one; therefore, there is no evidence that the results 
are driven by influential observations. 
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management.19 To address the endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variables approach. In a first-
stage regression, we model external financing (SEF) as a function of a set of instrumental variables and 
then, in a second-stage regression, we replace SEF in Model 7A with PSEF, the predicted value of SEF 
from the first-step regression. More specifically, we use the following models: 
 SEFi = α1ACQi + α2SCASHi + α3CAPEXi + α4LEVERAGEi + α5LAGROAi + α5LOGVALUEi  
                                 + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εi            (first stage) 
 ABCAi = α1PSEFi + α2SPPEi + α3PSEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect  
                     + εi,            (second stage) 
where ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction, SCASH is cash balance 
scaled by total firm value at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, CAPEX is capital 
expenditures in the year prior to the MBO announcement scaled by beginning assets, LEVERAGE is total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, LAGROA 
is return-on-assets for the year prior to the pre-MBO year, LOGVALUE is the logarithm of firm value, and 
the industry-fixed effects are indicator variables for manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms, 
respectively. The other variables are defined as before.  
  We include SCASH in the model because the need for external financing is likely to decrease in 
the amount of cash that the firm already has on hand. We include CAPEX because firms with recent 
investments in capital expenditures are probably more attractive to lenders, which would enable the firms 
to raise funds more easily from external sources. We add LEVERAGE and LAGROA because a firm’s 
ability to obtain external financing is likely to decrease in the amount of debt it already has and to 
increase in its profitability. Finally, we include LOGVALUE because, all else equal, it is more difficult for 
a firm to raise external funds to finance a large acquisition.         
                                                     
19If the rational expectations assumption employed in the model is literally true, which is arguably unlikely, then this 
particular endogeneity problem does not arise because, in equilibrium, the equity purchase price is independent of 
the equilibrium level of earnings management.       
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  The results for the first-stage regression are reported in Panel A of Table 7. The model is very 
powerful with an adjusted R2 of 0.855 when the industry dummies and the year-fixed effects are included 
in the model and 0.443 when they are excluded. The coefficients on ACQ, CAPEX, and LAGROA are 
significantly positive and the coefficients on SCASH, LEVERAGE, and LOGVALUE are significantly 
negative. The results for the second-step regression are reported in Panel B of Table 7. They are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. More specifically, the coefficients on the predicted 
value of external financing (PSEF) is significantly positive,  supporting the conjecture that firms that rely 
more on debt financing report less negative abnormal accruals prior to MBOs. The coefficient on the 
interaction between external financing and PP&E is also significantly negative, which is consistent the 
conjecture that the effect of external financing on the marginal cost of managing earnings down prior to 
MBOs increases when a firm has few physical assets that it can use as collateral.  
8. Summary and conclusion 
  When managers issue financial statements, they generally have conflicting reporting incentives 
because they face different user groups. One case where such a conflicting reporting incentive is likely to 
arise is when managers anticipate doing an MBO. Prior studies have suggested that managers would like 
to reduce equity market perceptions of the firm’s value in order to reduce the purchase price. The equity 
market incentive implies that managers would manage earnings downwards in anticipation of an MBO. 
We suggest that managers would also like to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the 
firm’s value in order to secure financing. The incentive to appeal to financiers suggests that managers 
would manage earnings upwards in anticipation of an MBO. Thus, managers face a conflicting reporting 
incentive arising from financing concerns. We also conjecture that the countervailing financing incentive 
should decrease with total fixed assets.  
   The results are consistent with the existence of the conflicting reporting incentive arising from 
external financing concerns. We find that firms that use more external funds to finance their MBO report 
less negative abnormal accruals. We also find that the positive effect of external financing on earnings 
management decrease as the amount of fixed assets increases, which is consistent with the conjecture that 
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the effect of external financing on the marginal cost of managing earnings down prior to MBOs increases 
as the firm has fewer physical assets that it can use as collateral.   
  Our results have relevance to regulators who are concerned with equity investors being subject to 
earnings management prior to MBOs and, more generally, other significant corporate events. In 
particular, with respect to MBOs, our results suggest that conflicting reporting incentives mitigate the 
incentives to manage earnings to take advantage of equity investors. The results also suggest that users of 
financial statements should carefully assess the magnitudes of conflicting reporting incentives when 
interpreting financial reports.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
ASSET is beginning total assets (in millions of dollars); BM is book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; EF, external financing, is the total amount of financing 
(in millions of dollars) raised from entities that are not associated with management or the MBO group; 
FIRM_VALUE is market value of common equity plus the value of preferred stock (Compustat data item 
130) plus total liabilities (in millions of dollars); SEF is EF scaled by FIRM_VALUE; ACQ is the 
proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; SCASH is cash balance scaled by 
FIRM_VALUE; ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; SPPE is net 
beginning property plant and equipment scaled by FIRM_VALUE; DEBT is total beginning long-term 
debt; DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of beginning long-term debt to ASSET; ROA is net income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled by ASSET; EBITDA is earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat data item 13) scaled by ASSET; CFO is cash flow from 
operations scaled by ASSET; CA is current accruals scaled by ASSET; DEP is depreciation and 
amortization scaled by ASSET; SI is special items scaled by ASSET; CHCAPEX is change in capital 
expenditures (Compustat data item 128) scaled by ASSET; CAR is the market adjusted return over the 
week centered on the MBO announcement; and PREMIUM is the offer price premium over the stock 
price four weeks prior to the MBO announcement. All the variables are defined in the fiscal year prior to 
the MBO announcement. External financing is deemed low (high) if total external financing (scaled by 
firm value) is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution within our sample firms. 
+++/++/+ indicates that the difference between “high” and “low” external financing firms is significant at 
the 1%/5%/10% level in a one-tail test. The tests of mean differences are based on the t-statistic, 
assuming unequal variances, and the tests for median differences are based on the Wilcoxon two-sample 
statistic. 
 
Variables  Full sample 
 
 Low external financing 
 
 High external financing 
   N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
ASSET  138 235.334 93.114  34 174.659 67.541  34 150.835 67.854 
BM  138 0.877 0.754  34 0.788 0.806  34 0.756 0.578 
EF  138 196.696 63.150  34 30.947 0.000  34 224.854+++ 139.000+++ 
FIRM_VALUE  138 302.211 118.947  34 208.581 66.359  34 218.481 113.107 
SEF  138 0.642 0.634  34 0.084 0.000  34 1.204+++ 1.218+++ 
SCASH  138 0.135 0.044  34 0.254 0.110  34 0.073+++ 0.042+++ 
ACQ  138 82.738 100.000  34 68.246 63.455  34 98.650+++ 100.000+++ 
SPPE  138 0.310 0.258  34 0.254 0.180  34 0.315 0.276 
DEBT-TO-ASSET  138 0.237 0.212  34 0.281 0.139  34 0.216 0.188 
ROA  138 0.030 0.047  34 -0.058 0.008  34 0.068+++ 0.063+++ 
EBITDA  137 0.144 0.156  33 0.064 0.079  34 0.201+++ 0.191+++ 
CFO  137 0.097 0.100  33 0.074 0.076  34 0.087 0.097 
CA  138 -0.010 -0.007  34 -0.068 -0.044  34 0.038+++ 0.011+++ 
DEP  137 0.054 0.046  33 0.057 0.042  34 0.058 0.053 
SI  134 -0.004 0.000  33 -0.018 0.000  34 -0.007 0.000 
CHCAPEX  138 -0.008 -0.002  34 -0.019 -0.010  34 0.006++ 0.002++ 
CAR  115 24.893 22.700  27 28.945 24.510  30 23.592 27.205 
PREMIUM  112 46.587 44.070  28 48.506 50.300  28 45.016 46.420 
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Table 2 
Abnormal current accruals prior to MBOs 
 
Discretionary current accrual is proxied by the difference between the abnormal current accrual (ABCA) 
of a firm and the median abnormal current accrual of a portfolio matched on industry and performance. 
We refer to the difference as the matched ABCA. The (unmatched) ABCA is the residual of the following 
regression: CAi = α0 + α1∆SALESit + α2LCAit + εit, where CA is current accrual; ∆SALES is change in 
sales; LCA in the lag of CA; and ε is the regression residual. Both sides of the regression are scaled by 
beginning total assets. The regression is estimated by year and (two-digit SIC code) industry, using all 
firm-years that have the necessary observations on Compustat. Year 0 refers to the fiscal year ending 
within 1 to 12 months prior to the MBO announcement and Year-2 refers to the fiscal year ending within 
25 to 36 months prior to the MBO announcement. In Panel A, we use two sets of firms. In the first set, we 
require that a firm have necessary data in Year 0 only; the number of observations is 138. In the second 
set, we require that a firm have necessary data in both Year 0 and Year-2; the number of observations is 
108. In Panel B, we report results for the first set only. One-tail p-values are presented in brackets and 
two-tail p-values in parentheses. They are based on the t-test for the mean and the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test for the median. We winsorize the top and bottom observations of the discretionary current accrual 
measures. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal current accruals in Year 0 and Year-2 for the full sample  
 
  Year 0 (Full sample) 
(N = 138) 
 
 Year 0 (Restricted 
sample) 
(N = 108) 
 Year-2 (Restricted sample) 
(N = 108) 
   Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched  
ABCA 
 Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched  
ABCA 
 Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched  
ABCA 
Mean  -0.021 
[0.001] 
-0.023 
[0.001] 
 -0.019 
[0.007] 
-0.021 
[0.003] 
 -0.002 
(0.756) 
-0.003 
(0.655) 
Median  -0.009 
[0.001] 
-0.010 
[0.001] 
 -0.009 
[0.007] 
-0.007 
[0.004] 
 0.004 
(0.681) 
0.008 
(0.652) 
 
Panel B: Abnormal current accruals in Year 0: Earlier versus later years  
 
  1985-1994 
(N = 63) 
 
 1996-2005 
(N = 75) 
   Unmatched ABCA Matched ABCA  Unmatched ABCA Matched ABCA 
Mean  -0.013 
[0.060] 
-0.013 
[0.053] 
 -0.028 
 [0.005] 
-0.030 
 [0.002] 
Median  -0.009 
[0.017] 
-0.007 
[0.012] 
 -0.008 
[0.020] 
-0.014 
[0.007] 
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Table 3 
Average abnormal current accruals in the year immediately prior to the MBO announcement by the level 
of external financing 
 
In Panel A, external financing is deemed low (high) if total external financing (scaled by total firm value 
at the beginning of the fiscal period) is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution 
within the sample firms. The two sub-periods are: 1985-1994 and 1996 – 2005. The sample has no 
observation in 1995. In Panel B, the top decile of external financing is based on the distribution of debt 
issuance (scaled by total value of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal period) for all the firms on 
Compustat that have necessary observations. For the MBO firms, external financing (SEF) is the amount 
raised from external sources to finance the MBO (scaled by total firm value at the beginning of the fiscal 
period). Discretionary accrual is as defined in Table 2. It is measured in the year prior to the debt 
issuance. One-tail p-values are presented in brackets and two-tail p-values in parentheses.   
 
Panel A: Full sample and cross-period comparison 
 
  Level of external financing Difference 
Full sample  Low 
(N = 34) 
 
Medium 
(N = 70) 
 
High 
(N = 34) 
 
 
High – Low 
 
Unmatched ABCA  -0.051 
[0.000] 
-0.023 
[0.011] 
0.013 
(0.317) 
 0.064 
[0.000] 
Matched ABCA  -0.049 
[0.001] 
-0.025 
[0.005] 
0.009 
(0.456) 
 0.058 
[0.001] 
Earlier years: 1985-1994  Low 
(N = 15) 
 
Medium 
(N = 32) 
 
High 
(N = 16) 
 
 High – Low 
 
Unmatched ABCA  -0.029 
[0.038] 
-0.023 
[0.026] 
0.023 
(0.175) 
 0.052 
[0.008] 
Matched ABCA  -0.033 
[0.032] 
-0.022 
[0.028] 
0.023 
(0.135) 
 0.056 
[0.013] 
Later years: 1996-2005  Low 
(N = 18) 
 
Medium 
(N = 38) 
 
High 
(N = 19) 
 
 High – Low 
 
Unmatched ABCA  -0.070 
[0.002] 
-0.022 
[0.008] 
0.000 
(0.985) 
 0.071 
[0.010] 
Matched ABCA  -0.063 
[0.006] 
-0.027 
[0.031] 
-0.005 
(0.800) 
 0.058 
[0.027] 
 
Panel B: MBO firms versus Compustat population 
 
  No external financing 
 
 Top decile of external financing 
 
 Difference 
 
  N Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched 
ABCA 
 N SEF Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched 
ABCA 
 Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched 
ABCA 
MBO firms  19 -0.080 
[0.009] 
-0.075 
[0.002] 
 101 0.844 -0.009 
[0.116] 
-0.012 
[0.049] 
 0.071 
[0.002] 
0.062 
[0.007] 
Compustat  
population 
 35,683 -0.002 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.826) 
 4,966 0.822 0.003 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.001) 
 0.005 
[0.000] 
0.004 
[0.002] 
Difference   -0.078 
[0.001] 
-0.075 
[0.001] 
  -0.022 
(0.509
) 
-0.012 
[0.058] 
-0.017 
[0.013] 
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Table 4 
Average abnormal current accruals in the year immediately prior to the MBO announcement by industry 
and level of external financing 
 
External financing is deemed low (high) if total external financing (scaled by total firm value at the 
beginning of the fiscal period) is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution. We do 
not report results for the middle quartiles. Discretionary accrual is as defined in Table 2. The number of 
observations is reported in brackets. ++/+ indicate that the difference between the high external financing 
group and the low external financing group is significant at the 5%/10% level in a one-tail test.  
 
Industrial sector  
(Two-digit SIC code) 
 Full 
Sample 
 Low  
external financing 
 High  
external financing 
  Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched  
ABCA 
 Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched 
ABCA 
 Unmatched 
ABCA 
Matched 
ABCA 
Manufacturing  
(20-39) 
 -0.027 
{59} 
 
-0.029 
{59} 
 
 -0.051 
{12} 
 
-0.056 
{12} 
 
 -0.008+ 
{12} 
 
-0.008++ 
{12} 
 
Merchandising  
(50-59) 
 -0.013 
{33} 
 
-0.016 
{33} 
 
 -0.044 
{5} 
 
-0.055 
{5} 
 
 0.011 
{11} 
 
0.007 
{11} 
 
Services  
(48, 49, 60-67, 70-87) 
 -0.023 
{41} 
 
-0.022 
{41} 
 
 -0.053 
{16} 
 
-0.041 
{16} 
 
 0.034++ 
{10} 
 
0.023++ 
{10} 
 
Other industries  
(13, 17, 40, 42, 45) 
 0.001 
{5} 
 
0.004 
{5} 
 
 -0.061 
{1} 
 
-0.055 
{1} 
 
 0.071 
{1} 
 
0.097 
{1} 
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Table 5 
Association between external financing and abnormal current accruals measured in the year immediately 
preceding the MBO year: Ordinary least square (N = 138) 
               
    ABCAi = α1SEFi + α2SPPEi + α3SEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect + εi.    (Panel A) 
 
    ABCAi = α1LOGEFi + α2LOGPPEi + α3LOGEFi*LOGPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi  
                               + Year Fixed Effect + εi,                  (Panel B) 
 
ABCA is the abnormal current accrual for the fiscal year the immediately precede the MBO 
announcement; SEF is total financing from external sources, which is scaled by total firm value in Panal 
A and is unscaled in Panal B; SPPE is the net beginning of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) scaled 
by total firm value; CNTR is the proportion of the company controlled by the MBO group prior to the 
MBO [1 – ACQ]; ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; BM is book 
value of equity divided by market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; and the subscript i 
stands for MBO i. Unexpected current accruals and abnormal current accruals are as defined in Table 2. 
Two-tail p-values are reported in parentheses and one-tail p-values are reported in brackets.  
 
Panel A: External financing is scaled 
 
 ABCA = Unmatched abnormal current 
accruals 
ABCA = Matched abnormal current  
accruals 
SEF 0.113 
[0.000] 
0.112 
[0.000] 
SPPE 0.177 
(0.001) 
0.187 
(0.000) 
SEF*SPPE -0.195 
[0.002] 
-0.212 
[0.001] 
CNTR 0.031 
[0.159] 
0.030 
[0.160] 
BM -0.012 
[0.078] 
-0.015 
[0.033] 
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.253 0.254 
 
Panel B: External financing is unscaled 
 
 ABCA = Unmatched abnormal current 
accruals 
ABCA = Matched abnormal current  
accruals 
LOGEF 0.025 
[0.001] 
0.024 
[0.003] 
LOGPPE 0.016 
(0.107) 
0.016 
(0.109) 
LOGEF*LOGPP -0.004 
[0.016] 
-0.004 
[0.019] 
CNTR 0.019 
[0.272] 
0.019 
[0.265] 
BM -0.001 
[0.456] 
-0.004 
[0.296] 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.201 0.188 
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Table 6 
Association between external financing and abnormal current accruals: The first year prior to the MBO 
(Year 0) versus the second year prior to the MBO (Year-2): Ordinary least square (N = 108) 
                  
      ABCAi = α1SEFi + α2SPPEi + α3SEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect + εi.   
 
In Year 0, we measure all the variables over fiscal year ending within 1 to 12 months prior to the MBO 
announcement and, in Year-2, we measure all the variables over fiscal year ending within 25 to 36 
months prior to the MBO announcement. We require that a firm have necessary observations in both Year 
0 and Year-2. The variables are defined in Tables 2 and 5. Two-tail p-values are reported in parentheses 
and one-tail p-values are reported in brackets. We do not report the year intercepts. 
 
Coefficient  ABCA = Unmatched abnormal 
current accruals 
 
ABCA = Matched abnormal current 
accruals 
 
 
Year 0 Year-2 
 
Year 0 Year-2 
SEF  0.100 
[0.007] 
-0.004 
(0.916) 
 0.128 
[0.001] 
-0.002 
(0.958) 
SPPE  0.154 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.882) 
 0.193 
(0.002) 
0.021 
(0.740) 
SEF*SPPE  -0.179 
[0.016] 
-0.056 
(0.485) 
 -0.239 
[0.003] 
-0.071 
(0.378) 
CNTR  -0.009 
[0.591] 
-0.045 
(0.275) 
 -0.005 
[0.550] 
-0.038 
(0.357) 
BM  -0.010 
[0.136] 
-0.010 
(0.600) 
 -0.016 
[0.040] 
-0.009 
(0.658) 
Year fixed effects 
 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
  0.153 0.048  0.222 0.035 
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Table 7 
Effect of external financing on abnormal current accruals measured in the year immediately preceding the 
MBO year: Two-stage least square (N = 138) 
               
 SEFi = α1ACQi + α2SCASHi + α3CAPEXi + α4LEVERAGEi + α5LAGROAi + α5LOGVALUEi  
                                 + Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εi            (first stage) 
 
 ABCAi = α1PSEFi + α2SPPEi + α3PSEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect  
                      + εi             (second stage) 
 
ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction, SCASH is cash balance scaled by 
total firm value at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, CAPEX is capital 
expenditures in the year prior to the MBO announcement scaled by beginning assets, LEVERAGE is total 
liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, LAGROA 
is return-on-assets for the year prior to the pre-MBO year, LOGVALUE is the logarithm of the firm value; 
and PSEF is the predicted value of SEF from the first-step regression. The other variables are defined as 
in Tables 2 and 5. Two-tail p-values are reported in parentheses and one-tail p-values are reported in 
brackets. We do not report the year intercepts. 
 
Panel A: First-stage regression 
 
 ACQ SCASH CAPEX LEVERAGE LAGROA LOGVALUE Fixed Effects Adj. R2 
Coefficient 
 
0.650 
 
-0.346 1.003 -0.317 0.613 -0.038 Yes 0.855 
One-tail p-value 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.052   
 
Panel B: Second-stage regression 
 
 ABCA = Unmatched abnormal current 
accruals 
ABCA = Matched abnormal current  
accruals 
PSEF 0.139 
[0.002] 
0.126 
[0.004] 
SPPE 0.170 
(0.016) 
0.154 
(0.027) 
PSEF*SPPE -0.190 
[0.023] 
-0.168 
[0.037] 
CNTR 0.048 
[0.115] 
0.046 
[0.122] 
BM -0.015 
[0.043] 
-0.017 
[0.024] 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.213 0.198 
 
 
 
 
 
